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Cake day: October 4th, 2023

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  • Nothing but hand-waiving for our Haitian neighbors who would actually benefit from that “stabilizing” presence

    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/14/what-is-the-history-of-foreign-interventions-in-haiti

    Since the early 1900s, there have been at least three direct interventions in Haiti, including a decades-long occupation by US forces.

    Given its pockmarked history of Haitian intervention, the US has expressed wariness towards leading a new international mission to Haiti. Many are calling for solutions to be Haitian-led, instead of foreign-led.

    “We need to give the Haitians time and space to get this right,” former US special envoy to Haiti, Daniel Foote, said in a recent interview with NPR.

    “Let’s let the Haitians have a chance to mess up Haiti for once. The international community has messed it up beyond recognition countless times. I guarantee the Haitians mess it up less than the Americans,” he added.



  • while Russia is only 10-20% or so.

    https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-hikes-national-defence-spending-by-23-2025-2024-09-30/

    Russia hikes 2025 defence spending by 25% to a new post-Soviet high

    Russia to spend 6.3% of GDP on national defence

    Defence spending at $145 billion, budget shows

    I mean, Russia has a benefit going away in the form of the Soviet weapons inventory, but we sent something like $62 billion to Ukraine in 2024. IIRC US-originating aid is on the order of half of what Ukraine got. Note that not all of this is grants, either…on the EU side, I believe that a considerable amount is loans on generous terms. I don’t know whether those might be forgiven or something, whether doing it as a “loan” might be to help make it more-palatable to EU voters, but point is, it may be less than the up-front number. Also, a lot of US aid is in military aid, which may not be in a form as ideal to Ukraine as simply cash; cash could be used to purchase anything, which may-or-may-not be exactly the military hardware that’s provided. Russia’s getting cash that can be used to purchase whatever (well, okay, within the constraints imposed by sanctions).

    But my broader point is, if Russia’s putting more resources into the conflict, we may well need to be willing to counter that.

    Also, keep in mind that some of those funds need to go to things like dealing with economic impact. Russia mostly has electrical power. Ukraine has lost something like 80% of their electrical output. That shuts down some of what Ukraine could be doing. If Ukraine cannot build something they need because an industry lacks electricity, then they need to import it, and that requires funds. Like, we can send a shit-ton of small generators and fuel to help offset that, but that costs something.

    And that a fair amount of what Ukraine is doing is air defense, and at least as things stand – a point that I saw just raised with the Israel/Iran missile issue – it’s generally cheaper to build something to throw something that explodes at the other guy than it is to build something that stops it before it hits.


  • considers

    If it gets a federal subsidy, that subsidy is going to really primarily benefit Pennsylvania, yes?

    I mean, yes, power from it maybe – if Microsoft isn’t schlorping all of it up – help support the grid in the region a bit. But if Microsoft’s building a datacenter in Pennsylvania and this is subsidizing a nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, the benefit’s really principally going to Pennsylvania alone, other than in the limited sense that it reduces carbon dioxide emissions.

    California or Nevada, say, isn’t going to benefit from that either way.

    Like, if there’s some sort of federal subsidy accessible to any state that wants to do nuclear power build-out and that this is just how Pennsylvania chooses to make use of it, that might be one thing.


  • We’re probably going to have to bump our own aid as well, unless we’re confident of an asymmetric counter to whatever Russia’s doing with her funds (e.g. building munitions factory == strike on munitions factory).

    I did read an article discussing that the US should be on firmer ground than last year politically on funds:

    https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-united-states-needs-a-long-term-approach-to-ukraine-aid/

    The April 2024 aid package was delayed for months by House Republicans, with Speaker Mike Johnson fearing that hardliners would strip him of his leadership position as they did with his predecessor. But Johnson was eventually convinced not just of the urgent need to help Ukraine win, but also that he had political cover to do so. Democrats pledged to save his position should it be at risk and, more importantly, former President Donald Trump came out publicly in support of the speaker’s efforts and backed him up after the package passed.

    Many Republicans in Congress had feared that supporting Ukraine aid could mean losing their seats, as the supplemental fight came just as members of Congress faced their intra-party primary election. Some incumbents were accused of putting Ukraine’s interests over those of the United States and faced attack ads over their past votes for Ukraine aid.

    Crucially, every single member of Congress who voted for the April 2024 supplemental aid package won their primary election. The importance of this cannot be overstated. These primary results will likely quell the fears among Republicans that supporting Ukraine could derail their political careers. On the contrary, given that polls show majority support for US aid to Ukraine, it could be an asset.


  • If China wants a war with the US – which I doubt, seeing as they haven’t started one by now and Taiwan would be a better reason for them to do so – they don’t need a treaty to have one. They can just go kick one off. The treaty just means that:

    • They have an obligation to act.

    • It provides grounds under the UN rules to act legally. But, end of the day, that only really matters to the degree that it affects what other countries do. And in this context, that probably mostly means the US anyway.

    If you look at Hong Kong, China just told the UK to get out or they’d take it. They didn’t have a legal basis for that. I don’t expect that a piece of paper would be a huge obstacle to involving themselves in Korea if they were willing to have a war over it.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handover_of_Hong_Kong

    During talks with Thatcher, China planned to seize Hong Kong if the negotiations set off unrest in the colony. Thatcher later said that Deng told her bluntly that China could easily take Hong Kong by force, stating that “I could walk in and take the whole lot this afternoon”, to which she replied that “there is nothing I could do to stop you, but the eyes of the world would now know what China is like”.

    There’s a reason they are constantly provoking Filipino ships and the like

    I don’t think that that indicates a desire for war. China has had outright hostilities over the islands before, with Vietnam, and China didn’t aim to convert it into broader war. I think – though I don’t follow the South China Sea situation much – that China’s aim in the South China Sea is to maintain a level of friction high enough that it’s painful for the countries to maintain a claim over those islands. At some point, the country either de facto or de jure cedes the territory and China keeps it.

    EDIT: There’s the Vietnam instance, where they brought friction up to a level of conflict, grabbed de facto control, but didn’t initiate a broader war:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Paracel_Islands




  • They already sold a fair bit of munitions from their stockpile to Russia. At least some of which Ukraine then blew up in their recent ammo depot attacks.

    I don’t know how much they have left, but my guess is that North Korea is probably in a worse place to attack South Korea than they have been for a while.

    Also, while North Korea does hold a strong deterrence ability over South Korea in that they can cause a lot of damage with artillery to Seoul, the flip side of that is that they’d be starting a war that they’d lose.

    From past reading, I believe that estimates are that it’d take us and South Korea days, but less than a week, to knock out North Korean artillery near the border. In that time, they’d cause horrendous damage. But then they’re in a really bad place. They don’t really have a route to militarily take over South Korea. All it’d mean is a horribly-damaging war for them.













  • You’re probably thinking of this like the US, which has a presidential system, where the president has a veto and Congress can override.

    Georgia has a parliamentary system, and typically there – don’t know about Georgia in particular – the president, if one exists, has a more symbolic role. Like, maybe he’s supposed to formally authorize legislation, but doesn’t really have a veto.

    EDIT: In the UK, the monarch – the head of state in the UK, like the president in a parliamentary system – sometimes has to do something, but on the “advice” of the elected government, which in practice means that in 2024, they don’t really have the option to not do it.

    https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/feb/07/how-queens-consent-raises-questions-over-uk-democracy

    Buckingham Palace insists that the monarch’s role is “purely formal”. Declassified files show that from time to time the palace has complained that the Queen has not been given enough time to respond, or that the government has treated the procedure too casually.

    If consent is withheld, parliament is in effect blocked from completing its scrutiny of the law. “If Queen’s or prince’s consent is not signified (in a case where it is required), the question on third reading of the bill … cannot be put,” parliamentary guidance states.

    Robert Blackburn, a professor of constitutional law at King’s College London, warned of “an inherent danger that a misguided future monarch or prince of Wales, holding strong moral views on the subject matter of a bill covered by the royal consent procedure, might believe he or she is entitled to impose his opinion on the matter”.